Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s “Rule of Mandates”

Mayling Birney

World Development, 2014, vol. 53, issue C, 55-67

Abstract: This paper shows why corruption is especially difficult to detect under China’s system of decentralized authoritarian rule, which I call a “rule of mandates.” Local officials must pursue high priority political targets but have immense discretion over which laws to implement. A relative standard for corruption consequently arises since non-implementation of laws may be mandate-serving or may be corrupt; and determining which requires extra information on why non-implementation occurred. The theory is supported by evidence from original survey and case research on the implementation of the village elections law. I discuss implications for anticorruption efforts, development patterns, and future research.

Keywords: Asia; China; corruption; authoritarianism; decentralization; rule of law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:53:y:2014:i:c:p:55-67

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.006

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