Administrative Overspending in Indonesian Districts: The Role of Local Politics

Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir, Krisztina Kis-Katos and Günther Schulze

World Development, 2014, vol. 59, issue C, 166-183

Abstract: We analyze the determinants of the excessive administrative spending of local governments in Indonesia. In an unbalanced panel data set of 399 districts for 2001–09, we show that the proliferation of districts has not led to increased administrative spending; instead a lack of political accountability is responsible for this excess. The degree of political competition influences the level of administrative spending significantly; newly introduced direct elections of district heads, however, did not curtail the waste.

Keywords: administrative expenditures; decentralization; direct elections; Indonesia; Asia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: Administrative overspending in Indonesian districts: The role of local politics (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:59:y:2014:i:c:p:166-183

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.01.008

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