Economic Regulations, Red Tape, and Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Communist Economies

Dinissa Duvanova

World Development, 2014, vol. 59, issue C, 298-312

Abstract: Should state regulatory involvement in the economy necessarily generate corruption? While excessive regulatory burden is often treated as a cause of corruption, this paper argues otherwise. It distinguishes regulatory policy, or de jure regulatory regimes from regulatory implementation and offers a more nuanced argument about the relationship between state regulations and bureaucratic corruption. The analysis of business survey data covering 25 post-communist economies demonstrates that mechanisms of regulatory implementation, rather than heavy-handed regulatory policy, are responsible for bribery. This analysis draws attention to the theoretical distinction between different types of regulatory hurdles and their differential effects on the quality of governance.

Keywords: economic regulation; corruption; street-level bureaucracy; Eastern Europe; Former USSR (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:59:y:2014:i:c:p:298-312

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.01.028

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