EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Does Money Buy Credit? Firm-Level Evidence on Bribery and Bank Debt

Zuzana Fungáčová (), Anna Kochanova () and Laurent Weill ()

World Development, 2015, vol. 68, issue C, 308-322

Abstract: We combine information on bribery practices with firm-level accounting data to examine how bribery influences bank debt ratios for a large sample of firms in 14 transition countries. We find that bribery is positively related to firms’ total bank debt ratios, which provides evidence that bribing bank officials facilitates firms’ access to bank loans. This impact varies with the maturity of the bank debt, as bribery contributes to higher short-term bank debt ratios but lower long-term bank debt ratios. Finally, we find that the institutional characteristics of the banking industry influence the relation between bribery and firms’ bank debt ratios.

Keywords: bank lending; bribery; corruption; Eastern Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X14004070
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Does money buy credit?: Firm-level evidence on bribery and bank debt (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Does Money Buy Credit? Firm-Level Evidence on Bribery and Bank Debt (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:68:y:2015:i:c:p:308-322

Access Statistics for this article

World Development is currently edited by O. T. Coomes

More articles in World Development from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2019-07-01
Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:68:y:2015:i:c:p:308-322