Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa

Karen Del Biondo

World Development, 2015, vol. 75, issue C, 74-84

Abstract: This article investigates why sanctions are applied unevenly in EU democracy promotion in Africa. Given the increased attention on good performers in development cooperation, we assume that not only strategic allies but also good development performers will be shielded from strong sanctions. This thesis is tested with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 17 cases of violations of democratic principles and human rights in nine sub-Saharan African countries in 2000–11. The QCA confirms that sanctions are taken in the absence of donor interests and developmental performance, and are not taken in the presence of donor interests and developmental performance.

Keywords: conditionality; Africa; European Union; democracy promotion; development cooperation; sanctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X14003519
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:75:y:2015:i:c:p:74-84

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.11.002

Access Statistics for this article

World Development is currently edited by O. T. Coomes

More articles in World Development from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().