How Investor Portfolios Shape Regulatory Outcomes: Privatized Infrastructure After Crises

Alison E. Post and María Victoria Murillo

World Development, 2016, vol. 77, issue C, 328-345

Abstract: Many developing countries privatized utilities during the 1990s. Their weak institutional environments, however, make them prone to crises that generate incentives for governments to renege on contractual commitments to investors. To understand variation in post-crisis regulatory outcomes in such contexts, scholars must consider investors’ prior choices regarding portfolio structure. Investors facing high reputational costs from exit are more likely to remain following expropriation, and those holding diverse assets in their contract jurisdiction, to secure compensation. These factors account for significant unexplained within-sector and subnational variation, for which we provide qualitative and quantitative evidence from Argentina’s water and electricity sectors following the 2001 crisis.

Keywords: regulation; utilities; infrastructure; political risk; crisis; privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:77:y:2016:i:c:p:328-345

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.08.006

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