Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Emmanuelle Auriol, Stephane Straub and Thomas Flochel ()

World Development, 2016, vol. 77, issue C, 395-407

Abstract: A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two dimensions. First, corrupt public institutions operate by offering contracts without competition and more corrupt entities channel larger share of their budget in this way. Second, these firms enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large-scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4-year period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the country’s GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions.

Keywords: procurement; corruption; rent-seeking; development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay (2015)
Working Paper: Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay (2011)
Working Paper: Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:77:y:2016:i:c:p:395-407

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.09.001

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