Do outside directors and new managers help improve firm performance? An exploratory study in Russian privatization
Mike W. Peng,
Trevor Buck and
Igor Filatotchev
Journal of World Business, 2003, vol. 38, issue 4, 348-360
Abstract:
In the context of privatization and restructuring in Russia, we test two standard agency theory hypotheses, namely, (1) outside board members and (2) new managers are positively related to firm performance. Based on a survey of 314 privatized firms, the evidence offers little support for the hypotheses. Historically, results refuting theories have been launch pads for scientific progress. Our findings, therefore, raise interesting questions about whether the underlying theory is appropriate, whether there are methodological problems, or whether there are institutional factors in Russia's transition economy that need to be accounted for when we test agency theory in a new setting. We address these questions and discuss their implications for corporate governance theory, practice, and public policy.
Keywords: Outside; directors; New; managers; Firm; performance; Russia; Privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)
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