The good, the bad, and the ugly: Technology transfer competence, rent-seeking, and bargaining power

Francesco Ciabuschi, Henrik Dellestrand and Philip Kappen

Journal of World Business, 2012, vol. 47, issue 4, 664-674

Abstract: In this paper, we explore the relationships between subsidiary technology transfer competence, bargaining power and rent-seeking. In the multinational corporation, technology transfer competence is generally perceived as something desirable. We connect this bright side of subsidiary-level processes to a potentially uglier and darker side of the organization, namely that subsidiaries gain bargaining power that is exercised for bad ends, i.e., rent-seeking. Using an empirical analysis that comprises intrafirm technology transfers, this paper finds that technology transfer competence leads to greater subsidiary bargaining power that in turn increases rent-seeking behavior; but this competence does not directly affect rent-seeking. We suggest that bargaining power offers a key explanation for rent-seeking. This paper advances the understanding of subsidiary sources of power within the multinational corporation and the organizational determinants of rent-seeking, which is relevant to theory development as well as to managers.

Keywords: Bargaining power; Competition and cooperation; Multinational corporation; Rent-seeking; Technology transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:worbus:v:47:y:2012:i:4:p:664-674

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DOI: 10.1016/j.jwb.2011.08.002

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