Unemployment Insurance and Union Behavior: Comparison of Some Paradigms and Endogenous Membership

Ana Paula Martins

Journal of Economics and Econometrics, 2012, vol. 55, issue 1, 19-38

Abstract: This paper discusses the sensitivity of the labor market outcome in the standard bargaining paradigms - monopoly union and efficient bargaining - to the existence of a budget constraint pending on the financing of the unemployment benefit. Consequences of how the unions value members and members' status (employed or unemployed) in their collective maximand, implications of union having control over membership, and, hence, of unemployment insurance coverage, are also considered, as well as of different fiscal scenarios on the form of financing the unemployment benefit bill.

Keywords: Unions; Wage Determination Models; Unemployment Benefit; Unemployment Insurance; Union Wage Bargaining; Union Membership. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 H39 H55 J51 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Unemployment Insurance and Union Behavior: Comparison of Some Paradigms and Endogenous Membership (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eei:journl:v:55:y:2012:i:1:p:19-38

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