An Olympic Level Playing Field? The Contest for Olympic Success as a Public Good

Loek Groot

Journal of Economics and Econometrics, 2012, vol. 55, issue 2, 25-50

Abstract: This article considers the performance of countries at the Olympic Games as a public good. Firstly, it is argued that, at the national level, Olympic success meets the two key conditions of a public good: non-rivalry and non-excludability. Secondly, it is demonstrated that standard income inequality measures, such as the Lorenz curve and the Gini index, can successfully be applied to the distribution of Olympic success. The actual distribution of Olympic success is compared with alternative hypothetical distributions, among which the noncooperating Nash-Cournot distribution, the distribution according to population shares and the one favoured by a social planner. By way of conclusion, it is argued, based on the Olympic Charter, that instruments to make the distribution of Olympic success more equitable are warranted to realize the true Olympic spirit as symbolized by the Olympic rings and the Parade of athletes.

Keywords: Olympic Games; public goods; rent-seeking; externalities; Nash noncooperative games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C53 C72 D63 D72 H41 H50 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ideas.repec.org/a/eei/journl/v55y2012i2p25-50.html
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eei:journl:v:55:y:2012:i:2:p:25-50

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Economics and Econometrics from Economics and Econometrics Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Julia van Hove ().