Striking Features of the Labor Market: Theory

William Greene and Ana Paula Martins

Journal of Economics and Econometrics, 2013, vol. 56, issue 2, 1-24

Abstract: The present paper develops a simple asymmetrical informational model that allows us to understand the individual´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor and enforce hours and offer different workweeks to the two types of workers a previous part-time/full-time wage schedules separating equilibrium was presented. In the other, only one work-week schedule can be offered.

Keywords: Strikes, asymmetric information, signaling, labor contracts, part-time work; mean or grouped data and limited dependent variables, binary choice models with mean or grouped data; sample selection with mean data. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C24 C25 D82 J41 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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