Evenhandedness in Arbitration: The Case of Major League Baseball

Homer Erekson, James Moser and Steven Schwartz
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Homer Erekson: University of Miami, Ohio
James Moser: AMA
Steven Schwartz: NERA

Eastern Economic Journal, 1989, vol. 15, issue 2, 117-127

Abstract: The focus of this study is how labor and management judge the degree of evenhandedness of arbitrators in major league baseball final-offer arbitration. The empirical work suggests that if a naive "win-loss" tallies approach is used, arbitrators in baseball may be deemed fair. However, if a richer model is employed whereby players and owners judge arbitration outcomes relative to some notion of the player's worth, a significant portion of arbitrators may be judged biased in their decisions.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:15:y:1989:i:2:p:117-127

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