Leviathan or Median-Voter: Who Runs City Hall?

Rexford Santerre ()

Eastern Economic Journal, 1991, vol. 17, issue 1, 5-14

Abstract: This study examines the effect of interjurisdictional competition and city age, as a proxy for special interest group activities, on the size of city government. Unlike previous studies on the Leviathan theory, the empirical analysis is well grounded in a median-voter model. The empirical results find mixed support for a Leviathan in city hall. On the one hand, city expenditures are found to be higher rather than lower with more intense competition. On the other hand, longer periods of democratic stability, measured by uninterrupted years of incorporation as a city, are associated with increased public expenditures, as a Leviathan-type model predicts.

Keywords: Government; Interest Group; Voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:17:y:1991:i:1:p:5-14

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