Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis

Steven Husted

Eastern Economic Journal, 1991, vol. 17, issue 1, 89-99

Abstract: This paper uses general equilibrium modeling popularized by J. Bhagwati to explore the economic consequences of foreign financed lobbying in an open economy. It is shown that, unlike domestic lobbying, foreign lobbying need not be directly unproductive, at least in the country where the lobbying occurs. Under plausible conditions, foreign lobbying may even raise domestic welfare relative to free trade with no lobbying. Also included in the paper are some data on the level and types of foreign lobbying in the United States in 1984. Contrary to popular belief, these expenditures appear to be quite small relative to other trade flows and potential benefits.

Keywords: Equilibrium; Free Trade; Lobbying; Trade; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:17:y:1991:i:1:p:89-99

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