Corruption, Black Markets, and the Fiscal Problem in LDCs: Some Recent Findings

John McLaren

Eastern Economic Journal, 1996, vol. 22, issue 4, 491-502

Abstract: Recent work in the area of tax evasion and fiscal corruption in LDCs has highlighted incentive theory and has produced some useful innovations in measurement. An interesting contrarian strain of research suggests that corruption and smuggling are sometimes use as tools of government, instead of being constraints on it. A case-by-case approach to these problems seems to be warranted.

Keywords: Black Market; Corruption; LDCs; Smuggling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Corruption, Black Markets, and the Fiscal Problem in LDC's: Some Recent Findings (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:22:y:1996:i:4:p:491-502

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