The Optimal Trust in Government

Jeff Clark () and Dwight Lee
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Jeff Clark: University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
Dwight Lee: University of Georgia

Eastern Economic Journal, 2001, vol. 27, issue 1, 19-34

Abstract: Public trust in government to promote the general interest has declined sharply since the early 1960s. Almost all those commenting on the trend see it as detrimental to government's ability to perform. We recognize that up to some level, trust does improve government performance, but beyond that level additional trust harms government performance by giving too much latitude to organized interest groups. Making use of the model of expressive voter behavior, we develop a model of the optimal trust in government, and consider how trust should vary over different political levels, and might cycle over time.

Keywords: Government Performance; Government; Interest Group; Voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:27:y:2001:i:1:p:19-34

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