Independence of the central bank as the main factor of its activities

A. Stepanenko

Economy and Forecasting, 2010, issue 4, 99-109

Abstract: The author reveals the advisability of the central bank' independence and its influence on the adaptivity of a national banking system. It is established that independence of the central bank objectively depends on the government's long term monetary policy.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://eip.org.ua/docs/EP_10_4_99_uk.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eip:journl:y:2010:i:4:p:99-109

Access Statistics for this article

Economy and Forecasting is currently edited by Iryna Bazhal

More articles in Economy and Forecasting from Valeriy Heyets
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Iryna Bazhal ().