Yes, There Are Hayekian Welfare States (At Least in Theory)

Andreas Bergh

Econ Journal Watch, 2015, vol. 12, issue 1, 22-27

Abstract: The neoclassical problem of distortionary taxation and the Hayekian knowledge problem are two different lines of argumentation against government interventions. When it applies, the Hayekian argument against government intervention is stronger than the neoclassical argument, because interventions can be designed to minimize distortions, but governments cannot escape the knowledge problem. A Hayekian welfare state would combine low levels of regulation with social insurance schemes that are not terribly vulnerable to the knowledge problem.

Keywords: Welfare state; regulatory state; regulation; redistribution; economists; Friedrich Hayek (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 A14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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