The Economic Analysis of Constitutions: Fatalism Versus Vitalism

Charles Blankart and Gerrit Koester

Econ Journal Watch, 2007, vol. 4, issue 2, 169-183

Abstract: We review the claim that the field of political economy has witnessed a quantum leap with Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini´s The Economic Effects of Constitutions. We find that the approach of Persson and Tabellini suffers from the neglect of previous research, notably in public choice tradition, a lack of a meaningful point of reference, and the disregard of individual liberty as a guiding principle. Their approach has only limited value for formulating, exploring, and judging institutional reforms, particularly reforms outside narrow bounds around the status quo of the liberal democracies.

Keywords: Positive political economy; constitutional political economy; constitutional choice; general economic theory; public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ejw:journl:v:4:y:2007:i:2:p:169-183

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