The Regulative Function of Property Rights

Larissa Katz

Econ Journal Watch, 2011, vol. 8, issue 3, 236-246

Abstract: In this paper, I examine three different models of how we manage our common resources through a system of private property rights. One model (the exclusion approach) is to control owners' decisions indirectly, through markets. Another model (the bundle-of-rights approach) is to regulate owners' decisions directly, by setting out specifically what they can or cannot do. These first two models have in common their focus on the substantive decisions that owners make. There is a third approach that emerges from my own account of ownership as a position of exclusive agenda-setting authority. A distinguishing feature of this model is that it restricts the class of _question_ that the owner may consider when dealing with the thing rather than the substantive answers that owners come up with.

Keywords: Property; bundle of rights; exclusion; exclusivity; legal realism; law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 K00 K1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ejw:journl:v:8:y:2011:i:3:p:236-246

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