Why the ?Transcendental? in Transcendental Realism?

Stefen D. Parsons
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Stefen D. Parsons: Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences, De Montfort University, U.K.

Ekonomia, 1997, vol. 1, issue 2, 22-38

Abstract: Transcendental realism criticises the predominant ?empirical realist? approach to economic theorizing. The term ?transcendental? is indebted to Kant However, whilst Kantian inspired transcendental arguments are concerned with logical prerequisites, and thus with empirical truth. Consequently, the empirical realist is not logically obliged to accept the transcendental realist argument. Further, as there is no observable difference between the world of the empirical realist and that of the transcendental realist, then the empirical realist is under no observational compulsion to accept the transcendental realist account. The claimed ?rebuttal? of empirical realism thus fails.

JEL-codes: B40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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