Mecanismos externos de control de la empresa: el papel de los bancos y el mercado de control en entornos de baja protección del inversor

Álvaro Cuervo García, Ana Isabel Fernández and Silvia Gómez Ansón
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Álvaro Cuervo García: Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Ana Isabel Fernández: Universidad de Oviedo

EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, 2002, vol. 50, issue 02, 57-73

Abstract: In the presence of asymmetric information and agency costs, corporate governance influences the firm’s market value. In this sense, it is necessary to consider that different factors affect the design and efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, firms’ ownership concentration, shareholders’ institutional and legal protection and the efficiency and development of markets determine the use of these mechanisms. These institutional differences in corporate governance systems influence the relations among shareholders, the efficiency of the Board of Directors and the existence of an active corporate control market that disciplines managerial opportunistic behavior.

JEL-codes: G32 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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