Propiedad y Control: Una Perspectiva Europea

Rafael Crepí and Miguel A. García-Cestona
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Rafael Crepí: Universitat de les Illes Balears
Miguel A. García-Cestona: Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona

EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, 2002, vol. 50, issue 02, 110-137

Abstract: This paper uses the ownership structure of firms as a key element to understand corporate governance problems. Countries in continental Europe are characterized by high levels of ownership concentration and significant voting blocks. United Kingdom and the US have a quite dispersed ownership. The different types of significant shareholders allow us to better understand the dominant governance model and point out solutions. We also describe the recent ownership evolution for Spanish listed firms and their characteristics. Finally, we consider executive compensation and executive turnover as control mechanisms that allow us the matching of shareholders´ interests and managers´ ones.

JEL-codes: G32 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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