Merger Policy and Efficiency Gains

Marcos Ávalos Bracho

Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, 2010, vol. XIX, issue 2, 343-376

Abstract: This paper provides a discussion on mergers and the role played by efficiency gains. By introducing a capacity-constrained Cournot model, we show that one way to extract useful information from merging firms is to design a scheme (requiring that the firms divest some of their assets) that leads to self-selection of the more socially worthwhile mergers.

Keywords: efficiency gains; merger policy; structural remedies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 D43 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:19:y:2010:i:2:p:343-376

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