The rules are no game

Jesse F. Dillard and Linda Ruchala

Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2005, vol. 18, issue 5, 608-630

Abstract: Purpose - Sees to argues that administrative evil is inherent in the administrative hierarchies currently governing work organizations, and to explore the means by which instrumentally rational processes morph into administrative evil. Design/methodology/approach - A critical theory methodology for identifying and describing administrative evil is outlined. Findings - Administrative evil refers to the use of technology, professionals, and hierarchical organizational structures in ways that divorce collective actions from their moral context. The role of technical accounting expertise, manifested as various devices, facilitates “ordinary” human beings' “rational” participation in “administrative evil” through a series of technically competent and instrumentally rational decisions, facilitated by information technology. Research limitations/implications - Divorcing actions from their moral context removes a sense of personal responsibility and accountability on the part of the organizational participants and renders public interest considerations captive to prevailing ideology and social structures. Practical implications - By better understanding the facilitating processes of administrative evil, possibly one can begin to develop alternative criteria that empower individuals to circumvent the negative consequences of instrumental rationality and enable them to act more responsibly in the public interest. Originality/value - Critical theory is used in better understanding administrative evil and in developing strategies for change.

Keywords: Business ethics; Work organization; Accounting; Management accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:aaajpp:09513570510620475

DOI: 10.1108/09513570510620475

Access Statistics for this article

Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal is currently edited by Prof James Guthrie and Prof Lee Parker

More articles in Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().