Role expectations and agency in the audit tendering process

Yvette Taminiau and Stefan Heusinkveld

Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2017, vol. 30, issue 8, 1820-1842

Abstract: Purpose - Tenders are generally considered important in auditing research and practice, and are associated with significant difficulties for the auditing profession, as well as for individual auditors in the context of client relationships. The purpose of this paper is to explore the way auditors respond to complex client expectations related to the audit tendering process. Design/methodology/approach - Using a role-theory perspective, the authors analyzed 75 client evaluations of auditors, along with in-depth interviews with high-level auditors. Findings - The authors present a theoretical framework of audit tenders that identifies different formal and informal practices auditors may employ in response to evolving client expectations that arise throughout different phases of the tendering process, and elucidate relevant conditions that may enable or impede these practices. Research limitations/implications - First, the study reveals that, in the context of auditor-client relationships, expectations cannot be considered stable, but may vary significantly throughout the tendering process. Second, the study indicates that auditors are not only determined by the formal tendering procedures, but are also influenced by their level of agency. Practical implications - The framework has practical value by providing individual auditors guidance in managing their client relationships and, further, top management guidance for creating favorable conditions for auditors to meet client needs. Originality/value - The findings provide a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the autonomy auditors have in responding to the contemporary pressures exerted on them.

Keywords: Audit tendering; Role expectations; Strategic agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:aaajpp:aaaj-10-2015-2258

DOI: 10.1108/AAAJ-10-2015-2258

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