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Institution-monopoly rent and competition amongst China's local governments: a Marxist analytical framework

Jie Meng and Fenghua Wu

China Political Economy, 2020, vol. 3, issue 2, 303-327

Abstract: Purpose - As a crucial institutional form established since the Chinese economic reform, the system of competitive local governments has been shaping the characteristics of China's socialist market economy to a considerable degree. Design/methodology/approach - This study not only adopts the view of existing studies that attribute the economic motive of local governments to rent and consider land public finance as a means through which local governments carry out strategic investment but also attempts to further develop the view within a Marxist analytical framework. Findings - As a result, the local governments have helped to maintain an incredibly high investment rate over a considerable period of time, facilitating the continuous, rapid growth of the Chinese economy. Originality/value - This study concludes that China's local governments function as the productive allocator and user of rent in the strategic investment based on land public finance and thereby embed themselves in the relative surplus-value production initially arising from competition amongst enterprises, forming the dual structure of relative surplus-value production unique to China's economy.

Keywords: Local government competition; Class-monopoly rent; Economic role of the state; Relative surplus-value production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:cpepps:cpe-10-2020-0018

DOI: 10.1108/CPE-10-2020-0018

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