Executive compensation linked to corporate social responsibility and firm risk

Lucia Gao, Shahbaz Sheikh and Hong Zhou

International Journal of Managerial Finance, 2022, vol. 19, issue 2, 269-290

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the relationship between executive compensation linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm risk. It also explores the moderating role of CSR-linked compensation on the relationship between risk-taking incentives provided in executive compensation and firm risk. Design/methodology/approach - This study uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and firm-fixed effects regressions to estimate the association between CSR-linked compensation and firm risk. Furthermore, it employs instrumental variable, propensity score matching and first-order difference approaches to address concerns about endogeneity and sample selection. Findings - Benchmark results show that CSR-linked compensation reduces both total and idiosyncratic measures of risk. Further results indicate that CSR-linked compensation reduces firm risk only when risk is above the optimal level and has no significant effect when risk is below the optimal level. Additionally, tests show that CSR-linked compensation also mitigates the positive effect of Vega of executive compensation on risk and this mitigation effect is significant only when risk is above the optimal level. Practical implications - The empirical results of this study show that boards can use CSR-linked compensation not only to induce higher social performance but also as a risk management tool to manage risk, especially when risk is above value increasing optimal levels. Furthermore, boards can use CSR-linked compensation to mitigate excessive risk-taking induced by option compensation. Originality/value - This study contributes to the emerging literature on CSR-linked compensation and firm risk. To our knowledge, this is the first study that documents the direct risk-reducing effect of CSR-linked compensation and its mitigating effect on the relation between Vega of executive compensation and firm risk.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Risk incentives; Corporate social responsibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:ijmfpp:ijmf-10-2021-0511

DOI: 10.1108/IJMF-10-2021-0511

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