Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the mafia must now welcome organizational crime

F.N. Baldwin

Journal of Financial Crime, 2010, vol. 17, issue 4, 404-416

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to explore organized crime on Wall Street and expose the lack of regulatory control thus impacting upon innocent investors in the money market. Organized crime has for many years reaped rewards from unsuspecting investors. This exploration, however, aims to turn away from organized and focus on organizational crime. Specifically, the “highly respected” investor Bernard Madoff. Design/methodology/approach - This paper examines the impact upon innocent investors of the US Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) response to repeated efforts by a whistle blower to investigate an “alleged” out‐of‐control “Ponzi” scheme. Findings - Bernard Madoff's multi‐billion dollar Ponzi scheme was never uncovered by the SEC. The fact is that the economic recession did the SEC's work. The SEC appeared to be willfully blind. Without the economic recession, some suggest that the Madoff Ponzi scheme might have involved close to 100 billion dollars. Originality/value - The SEC's regulatory effectiveness in regulating the financial industry was found wanting for over ten years. No regulatory agency ever determined Madoff to be in serious violation of any laws, hence others within the financial industry continued to engage in similar illicit organizational activity. The question remains whether regulatory agencies have learned a lesson from the Madoff episode or is the organizational Ponzi scheme alive and well?

Keywords: Crimes; Corruption; Stock markets; United States of America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfcpps:13590791011082760

DOI: 10.1108/13590791011082760

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Crime is currently edited by Dr Li Hong Xing and Prof Barry Rider

More articles in Journal of Financial Crime from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().