Executive remuneration: the power and dominance of human greed

Ernestine Gheyoh Ndzi

Journal of Financial Crime, 2019, vol. 26, issue 4, 978-992

Abstract: Purpose - The paper aims to examine the role of human greed in the determination of executive remuneration in the UK. Design/methodology/approach - The paper reviews the past and existing regulation and corporate governance recommendations on executive remuneration. Findings - The paper demonstrates that the failure of regulatory mechanisms to curb excessive executive remuneration can be justified on the grounds of human greed. Greed is facilitated by the potential conflict of interest that exists as a result of the executives’ position in the company. The position of the law has given greed the opportunity to manifest, making it quite difficult for executive remuneration to be effectively regulated. Originality/value - The paper adds to the existing debate on excessive executive remuneration by demonstrating that human greed is the basis of excessive executive remuneration on which limited literature exists.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Executive remuneration; Human greed; Companies Act 2006 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfcpps:jfc-06-2017-0059

DOI: 10.1108/JFC-06-2017-0059

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