Earnings management and audit quality at Damascus securities exchange: does managerial ownership matter?

Zukaa Mardnly, Zinab Badran and Sulaiman Mouselli

Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, 2021, vol. 19, issue 5, 725-741

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the individual and combined effect of managerial ownership and external audit quality, as two control mechanisms, on earnings management. Design/methodology/approach - This study applies ordinary least squares estimates on fixed-time effects panel regression model to test the impact of the investigated variables on earnings management for the whole population of banks and insurance companies listed at Damascus Securities Exchange (DSE) during the period from 2011 to 2018. Findings - The empirical evidence suggests a negative non-linear relationship between managerial ownership (as proxied by board of directors’ ownership) on earnings management. However, neither audit quality nor the simultaneous effect of the managerial ownership and audit quality (Big 4) affects earnings management. Research limitations/implications - DSE is dominated by the financial sector and the number of observations is constrained by the recent establishment of DSE and the small number of firms listed at DSE. In addition, the non-availability of data on executive directors’ and foreign ownerships restrict our ability to uncover the impact of different dimensions of ownership structure on earnings management. Practical implications - First, it stimulates investors to purchase stocks in financial firms that enjoy both high managerial ownership, as they seem enjoying higher earnings quality. Second, the findings encourage external auditors to consider the ownership structure when choosing their clients as the financial statements’ quality is affected by this structure. Third, researchers may need to consider the role of managerial ownership when analyzing the determinants of earnings management. Originality/value - It fills the gap in the literature, as it investigates the impact of both managerial ownership and audit quality on earnings management in a special conflict context and in an unexplored emerging market of DSE. It suggests that managerial ownership exerts a significant role in controlling earnings management practices when loose regulatory environment combines conflict conditions. However, external audit quality fails to counter earnings management practices when conditions are fierce.

Keywords: Earnings management; Ownership structure; Managerial ownership; Damascus Securities Exchange; External audit quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrapp:jfra-06-2020-0162

DOI: 10.1108/JFRA-06-2020-0162

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