Money laundering and corrupt officials: a dynamic model

Cassandro Mendes and Jailson Oliveira

Journal of Money Laundering Control, 2013, vol. 16, issue 1, 55-61

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model to study the impact of corruption on money laundering. Design/methodology/approach - The relationship between corruption and money laundering has been modelled by using differential games. Findings - The authors' model suggests that corruption increases the quantity of dirty money laundered in the formal economy. It was also found that, jointly with the anti‐laundry regulations, the government should create a better salary policy, as a way to control corruption of federal officials. Originality/value - To best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first theoretical paper that studies the link between money laundering and corruption.

Keywords: Mathematical modelling; Corruption; Money laundering; Public administration; Differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jmlcpp:13685201311286850

DOI: 10.1108/13685201311286850

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money Laundering Control is currently edited by Dr Li Hong Xing and Prof Barry Rider

More articles in Journal of Money Laundering Control from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().