An institutional perspective of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act
Richard L. Baker,
William E. Bealing,
Donald A. Nelson and
A. Blair Staley
Managerial Auditing Journal, 2006, vol. 21, issue 1, 23-33
Abstract:
Purpose - In the light of recent financial scandals, such as Enron, Global Crossing and WorldCom, the purpose of this paper is to use an institutional theory perspective to examine the interactions between the accounting profession, the SEC and the Congress. Design/methodology/approach - The paper takes an institutional perspective of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act and reviews how historical events have led to various institutional developments, which, in turn, have resulted in accountancy changes. Findings - The end result is posited to be an outcome that enhances the legitimacy of the SEC to regulate the accounting profession. At the same time, the accounting profession will emerge from the events able to proclaim that it is improved. Finally, politicians will garner favor from the voters since they have acted to protect the public from financial frauds. Originality/value - Describes how the relationship among the three parties is in reality a highly predictable set of behaviors that will allow all of the participants to demonstrate legitimacy to their external constituents and enable each party to secure enhanced future resources.
Keywords: Accountancy; Organizational theory; Economic history; United States of America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:02686900610634739
DOI: 10.1108/02686900610634739
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