Ownership structure, board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure
Xiao Huafang and
Yuan Jianguo
Managerial Auditing Journal, 2007, vol. 22, issue 6, 604-619
Abstract:
Purpose - The paper aims to examine the impact of ownership structure and board composition on voluntary disclosures of listed companies in China. Design/methodology/approach - Using an OLS‐regression model to test the relationship among ownership structure, board composition and the level of voluntary disclosure. The sample is based on 559 firm observations in 2002. Findings - Higher blockholder ownership and foreign listing/shares ownership is associated with increased disclosure. However, managerial ownership, state ownership, and legal‐person ownership are not related to disclosure. An increase in independent directors increases corporate disclosure and CEO duality is associated with lower disclosure. The paper also finds that larger firms had greater disclosure, while firms with growth opportunities are reluctant to disclose information voluntarily. Research limitations/implications - Firstly, the sample is comprised of companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2002 and only 45.7 percent of representative firms listed in China. Secondly, the disclosure checklist does not cover all voluntary disclosure in corporations as employed and supported in several prior studies. Thirdly, the award of checklist items may be subjected to errors. Practical implications - This paper indicates the relationship among ownership structure, board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure, and provides evidence for Chinese regulators to improve corporate governance and optimize ownership structure. Originality/value - Distinct from prior empirical research based on disclosure behavior in developed‐western markets, this study examines the impact of ownership structure and board composition on voluntary disclosures of listed companies in the Asian setting of China.
Keywords: Disclosure; China; Corporate ownership; Boards of directors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:02686900710759406
DOI: 10.1108/02686900710759406
Access Statistics for this article
Managerial Auditing Journal is currently edited by Professor Jie Zhou
More articles in Managerial Auditing Journal from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().