Financial information systems service providers and the internal control report

Albert L. Nagy

Managerial Auditing Journal, 2008, vol. 23, issue 6, 596-608

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine if a conflict of interest arises when auditors opine on an internal control system that consists of an information system recently designed and implemented by their own firm. Design/methodology/approach - A sample of companies was selected that had a financial information design and implementation service (FISD) disclosure in 2000‐2001 and a Section 404 internal control report issued in 2004‐2005. Both descriptive statistics and logistic regression results provide insight into the relation between the type of internal control report issued and the FISD provider. Findings - After considering the type of auditor change (forced versus voluntary) and the timing of the consulting division split‐offs, the results suggest that a material weakness internal control report is less likely if the same audit firm issued the internal control opinion and performed the FISD service. This result lends some support to the regulator's concern that certain types of non‐audit services (NAS) may cause auditors to audit their own work. Originality/value - This study contributes to the literature by examining if the performance of a certain type of NAS (FISD) resulted in auditors auditing their own work when opining on certain internal control systems. To the author's knowledge, this is the first study of its type in relation to auditors auditing their own work.

Keywords: Financial information; Financial services; External auditing; Information systems; Legislation; United States of America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:02686900810882129

DOI: 10.1108/02686900810882129

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial Auditing Journal is currently edited by Professor Jie Zhou

More articles in Managerial Auditing Journal from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().