The effects of recurring and non‐recurring non‐audit services on auditor independence

Deborah Alexander and David Hay

Managerial Auditing Journal, 2013, vol. 28, issue 5, 407-425

Abstract: Purpose - This study seeks to examine whether there are differences between companies that purchase either recurring or non‐recurring audit services and those that do not, and whether auditors discount their audit fees for either type of non‐audit service. Design/methodology/approach - The study examines associations between audit and non‐audit fees in New Zealand, for the period 1995 to 2001. The advantage of this setting is that data on non‐audit services was disclosed in this period and that the period pre‐dates more recent controversies over whether non‐audit services are permissible. Findings - Companies that purchase any type of non‐audit services from their auditors are larger and more complex than companies that purchase auditing only. Companies that obtain tax services from their auditors usually do so on a recurring basis. In contrast, consulting services do not tend to occur every year. Auditors do not discount their fees for either recurring or non‐recurring non‐audit services. Research limitations/implications - While useful data is available about the type of non‐audit services provided, there are limitations to the extent to which this information provides a precise measure of whether the services were recurring or not. Originality/value - The research contributes to understanding the issues regarding auditors providing non‐audit services by providing evidence that neither recurring nor non‐recurring services are associated with a reduction in audit fees. This finding is relevant when considering whether regulation of non‐audit services should permit certain types of services, or should prohibit all non‐audit services.

Keywords: Auditing; Audit fees; Non‐audit services; Auditor independence; Tax services; Consulting services; New Zealand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:02686901311327191

DOI: 10.1108/02686901311327191

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