CSR disclosure in family-controlled and politically connected firms: Do audit committees matter?

Md. Harun Ur Rashid, Mohammad Ahsan Habib and Rashid Zaman

Managerial Auditing Journal, 2026, vol. 41, issue 5, 926-961

Abstract: PurposeThis study aims to investigate whether audit committees shape the corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure practices of family-controlled and politically connected firms. Specifically, this study examines the extent to which audit committees mitigate the tendency of these firms to withhold CSR information and enhance transparency in an emerging market context.Design/methodology/approachThis study analyses 1,108 firm-year observations from 140 non-financial firms listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange over the period 2013–2023. To examine how family control, political connections and audit committees influence CSR disclosure. This study estimates several multivariate regression models. In addition, to strengthen causal inference and address potential endogeneity concerns. This study employs entropy balancing and a regression discontinuity design as complementary identification strategies.FindingsThis study finds that family control and political connections significantly reduce CSR disclosure, whereas effective audit committees enhance transparency and mitigate these negative effects. CSR disclosure is lowest in firms that are both family-controlled and politically connected, indicating mutually reinforcing constraints on transparency. However, audit committees consistently counteract these tendencies. Their effectiveness strengthens after the Corporate Governance Code 2018 and is particularly pronounced in firms with low institutional ownership and in environmentally sensitive industries. Finally, audit committees’ independence, accounting expertise and female representation further improve CSR reporting and enhance the committee’s moderating role.Practical implicationsThis study suggests that regulators and firms should promote balanced governance mechanisms that curb opportunistic behaviour by family owners and politically connected directors while retaining the benefits these governance structures offer. Strengthening audit committees, particularly by enhancing their independence, expertise and diversity, has significant potential to mitigate the negative effects of family influence and political capture and support greater CSR disclosure.Social implicationsThis study highlights the critical role of strong internal governance, particularly effective audit committees, in promoting transparent CSR practices in firms characterised by concentrated family ownership and political connections. In emerging markets like Bangladesh, where external enforcement is limited, empowered audit committees help curb opportunistic behaviour, strengthen accountability and protect stakeholder interests. The findings support ongoing governance reforms and emphasise the need for greater public awareness around the social responsibilities of influential business groups, ultimately contributing to improved transparency, fairer stakeholder treatment and stronger trust between firms and society.Originality/valueThis study offers novel evidence by jointly examining how family control and political connections shape CSR disclosure, and by establishing the moderating role of audit committees within these ownership settings. Unlike prior research, which typically investigates these governance factors individually, this study provides an integrated analysis that reveals how audit committees can counteract the combined influence of family dominance and political embeddedness. This multidimensional approach advances understanding of internal governance effectiveness in emerging markets.

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; CSR disclosure; Corporate governance; Audit committees; Family control; Political connections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:maj-02-2025-4684

DOI: 10.1108/MAJ-02-2025-4684

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