The impact of audit reforms on objectivity during the performance of non-audit services
Richard G. Brody,
Christine M. Haynes and
Craig G. White
Managerial Auditing Journal, 2014, vol. 29, issue 3, 222-236
Abstract:
Purpose - – This research aims to explore whether recent audit reforms have improved auditor objectivity when performing non-audit services. Design/methodology/approach - – In two separate experiments, the authors tested whether external and internal auditors' inventory obsolescence judgments are influenced by their client's (or company's) role as the buyer or seller in an acquisition setting. Findings - – External auditors assessed the likelihood of inventory obsolescence objectively, regardless of their consulting role in the acquisition setting. Internal auditors assessed the likelihood of inventory obsolescence as higher when consulting for the buyer than when consulting for the seller, consistent with the supposition that the buyer would prefer to write-down inventory and negotiate a lower purchase price, whereas the seller would prefer the inventory not be written down. Practical implications - – From a regulatory perspective, external auditors may be relying too much on the work of internal auditors if internal auditors' lack of objectivity as consultants extends to their assurance role. Originality/value - – This paper extends prior research in the area of internal and external auditor objectivity and is the first paper to include both subject groups in the same experiment. It also addresses the current policy issues that may have a significant effect on audit quality and auditor liability.
Keywords: Non-audit services; Objectivity; External auditor judgments; Internal auditor judgments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:maj-06-2013-0888
DOI: 10.1108/MAJ-06-2013-0888
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