Family firms, political connections and audit fees: evidence from Malaysian firms

Chwee Ming Tee

Managerial Auditing Journal, 2018, vol. 33, issue 6/7, 613-632

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the association between family firms and audit fees in an emerging economy setting. As family firms either face Type 1 or Type 2 agency problem, it seeks to gain a better understanding on family firms in an emerging economy such as Malaysia. Additionally, this study introduces political connections to investigate whether it can moderate the association between family firms and audit fees. Political connection is chosen as an important institutional feature because of its many and well-documented politically connected firms and pervasive political patronage system in Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach - Based on a dataset of 750 firms or 7,848 firm-year observations from 2002 till 2015, panel regression analysis is used to investigate the research questions. As a robustness test, Heckman’s self-selection model is used to deal with the self-selection problem. Findings - The results reveal that family firms are associated with higher audit fees, indicating that Type 2 dominates Type 1 agency problems in Malaysia. This positive relationship is stronger in family firms which are older and have higher family controlling shareholding. Further, the association is exacerbated if it is also connected to the ruling elite. Originality/value - This study contributes to the literature by showing that institutional feature such as family firms and political connections can produce different firm outcomes between emerging and advanced economy, particularly in auditing. This study responds to calls for more research on auditing in family firms, particularly in emerging economy.

Keywords: Malaysia; Audit fees; Family firms; Political connections; M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:maj-06-2017-1585

DOI: 10.1108/MAJ-06-2017-1585

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