Trade-offs in the relationship between competition and audit quality

Nam Ho

Managerial Auditing Journal, 2021, vol. 37, issue 1, 39-68

Abstract: Purpose - Fears over public accounting becoming increasingly concentrated have inspired several attempts to study the relationship between competition and audit quality. These studies have yielded conflicting results without a clear reason as to why. This paper aims to propose a new approach and empirically demonstrate a non-monotonic association between competition and audit quality. Design/methodology/approach - Using metropolitan statistical area level data from the USA over the period of 2000–2014, the author shows that the effect that changes in the competition will have on audit quality depends upon the current competitive state of the market. Findings - Audit quality is at its highest level when competition is neither too high nor too low. In addition, the point of inflection at which competition turns from being helpful to harmful is influenced by the saturation of the Big 4 auditors in the market. Practical implications - These findings can help explain the mixed results of the literature and provide insight into the role that regulators can play in modulating competition. Originality/value - This is the first paper to document a non-monotonic relationship between competition and audit quality. By introducing and exploring the validity of a non-monotonic component in the audit quality equation, the authors can better determine, which competitive structures generate desired levels of audit quality.

Keywords: Audit quality; Competition; Market concentration; Market structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:maj-11-2020-2910

DOI: 10.1108/MAJ-11-2020-2910

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