Audit fees via an indirect payment channel and professional skepticism

Sanghun Kim, Taewoo Kim, Sujin Pae and Sangphill Kim

Managerial Auditing Journal, 2018, vol. 33, issue 5, 517-534

Abstract: Purpose - This paper aims to examine the merit of an indirect payment system for audit fees, a system where an intermediary collects fees from the auditee and then pays this audit fee to the auditor. Design/methodology/approach - Big 4 auditors and professional analysts in South Korea participated in an experiment and survey to investigate whether the change in the payment channel (from direct to indirect) of audit fees positively impacts auditors’ decision-making. Findings - The authors find evidence that the indirect payment of audit fees is positively associated with professional skepticism. Research limitations/implications - This paper, by highlighting the potential for alternate auditor payment channels to improve the quality of auditor judgments, motivates future research in this area. Practical implications - Qualified by the need for further research, the potential merit in an indirect payment system may have implications for audit regulators. Social implications - An indirect payment channel has the potential to improve public perceptions of the audit function, thereby elevating society’s confidence in auditor opinions and improving the effectiveness and efficiency with which scarce resources are distributed within society. Originality/value - This study is one of the first that looks into a systematic change in audit fee payment channel and how an indirect payment system of audit fees impacts professional skepticism.

Keywords: Audit fee; Auditor independence; Professional skepticism; Indirect payment channel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:maj-12-2016-1490

DOI: 10.1108/MAJ-12-2016-1490

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