CEO power and integrated reporting

Isabel-Maria Garcia-Sanchez, Nicola Raimo and Filippo Vitolla

Meditari Accountancy Research, 2020, vol. 29, issue 4, 908-942

Abstract: Purpose - This study aims to analyse the role that the chief executive officer (CEO) has on integrated reporting (IR) adoption and whether this role is moderated by incentives to promote corporate transparency, including information asymmetry problems and financial constraints. IR represents the last frontier of corporate disclosure and aims to represent, through the annual integrated report, the ability of an organization to create value over time. Design/methodology/approach - This study is based on 10,819 observations (an unbalanced data panel of 1,588 firms for the period 2009–2017). A logistic regression model is used to examine the association between CEO power and disclosure of an integrated report. Findings - The results show that CEOs with greater power oppose the disclosure of integrated information, and this behaviour is not modified by firms’ incentives. Furthermore, greater growth opportunities increase CEO opposition to disclosing integrated information on the creation of value, perhaps as a consequence of the possible use of it by competitors. Originality/value - This study contributes to the existing literature. First, it expands the scientific debate on the topic of IR. Second, it extends the application field of agency theory, which is seldom used to explain the phenomena related to IR.

Keywords: Disclosure; Integrated reporting; CEO; Agency theory; CEO power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:medarp:medar-11-2019-0604

DOI: 10.1108/MEDAR-11-2019-0604

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