Delegation and salary information disclosure strategies of customer acquisition and retention

Weiting Wang, Yi Liao and Jiacan Li

Nankai Business Review International, 2024, vol. 16, issue 1, 1-25

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism. Design/methodology/approach - This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy. Findings - The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market. Originality/value - This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

Keywords: Principal–agent model; Delegation strategy; Wage transparency; Service supply chain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:nbripp:nbri-03-2023-0030

DOI: 10.1108/NBRI-03-2023-0030

Access Statistics for this article

Nankai Business Review International is currently edited by Dr Xuexiu Wang and Professor Li Wei'an

More articles in Nankai Business Review International from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().