EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Do managers manipulate earnings to influence credit rating agencies’ decisions?

Qiuhong Zhao

Review of Accounting and Finance, 2017, vol. 16, issue 3, 366-384

Abstract: Purpose - This study aims to investigate whether firms engage in earnings management behavior that attempts to manipulate Credit Rating Agency (CRA) perceptions during the Watchlist process and, if so, whether earnings management behavior appears to influence CRAs’ decisions. Design/methodology/approach - To measure earnings management activities, this paper computes accrual-based and real earnings management measures in the year or in the quarter immediately before the Watchlist resolutions for all negative and positive Watchlist firms. To examine the association between the levels of earnings management and Watchlist resolutions, a logit model is applied to the data obtained from a sample of Watchlist firms. Findings - Some evidence suggests that managers in Watchlist firms manage earnings in attempts to gain favorable Watchlist treatment. The findings are consistent with theGrahamet al.’s (2005)survey evidence, which shows that one of the primary reasons for earnings management is to gain (or preserve) a desirable rating. In addition, CRAs appear to be misled by these attempts during the negative Watchlist process period. Research limitations/implications - The findings support SEC’s (2011, 2013a, 2013b) rules to reduce its reliance on credit ratings and the recent regulation reforms concerning the competition in the rating industry [the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (2006)], and concerning conflicts of interest of CRAs among others [Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010)]. Originality/value - While many studies examine whether managers use discretionary accruals as a tool to manage earnings to obtain favorable ratings, those studies do not consider manipulation of real operating activities to manage earnings and CRA perceptions.

Keywords: Earnings management; Credit rating agencies; Credit watch; G10; M41; M43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rafpps:raf-05-2016-0078

DOI: 10.1108/RAF-05-2016-0078

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Accounting and Finance is currently edited by Nawazish Mirza

More articles in Review of Accounting and Finance from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eme:rafpps:raf-05-2016-0078