Licencia de patentes no drásticas, estructura de mercado e información simétrica entre los licenciados

Manel Antelo

Estudios Económicos, 1998, vol. 13, issue 2, 123-155

Abstract: We analyze the dynamics of non drastic patents lasting for several periods when its owner is asymmetrically informed in relation to their users. Patentees learn by using the patent their cost characteristics, and there is symmetric information among them. In this setting, we show that the trade off between the sampling effect and the dissipation effect determines the patent efficient allocation from the market viewpoint. We also show that the incentive compatibility problem in some contracts those ones which are based on the users' information precludes sometimes the patent owner to implement efficient allocations. Finally, it is shown that, from the social viewpoint, a duopoly in each production period is the optimal market structure to be generated.

Date: 1998
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