Elección de tecnología entre el principal y el agente en un contexto evolutivo

Jhon Mora Rodriguez ()

Estudios Económicos, 1998, vol. 13, issue 2, 225-247

Abstract: This paper discusses the necessary conditions for principal and agent contract in an evolutionary interactive context and how a specific technology prevails. The resulting stability condition is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, ESS, in the Maynard Smith tradition. When productivity is greater or equal to one arises a ESS in a particular technology and when productivity is less than one the only way to explain why a particular technology prevails is by means of a convention.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:13:y:1998:i:2:p:225-247

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