Entre familia y amigos: la elección de la estructura de propiedad corporativa

Ramón A. Castillo Ponce
Additional contact information
Ramón A. Castillo Ponce: Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, California State University, Los Angeles

Estudios Económicos, 2007, vol. 22, issue 1, 3-18

Abstract: The document presents an analysis, developed under the framework of conflict theory, which models the choice of ownership structure as the result of a power struggle between the owner of a firm and potential shareholders. The theoretical model suggests that, when the system that protects property rights is inefficient, the choice of keeping the ownership of the firm within the family represents the strategy that provides the owner the highest value when going public.

Keywords: family firm; legal system; conflic theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G0 G3 L0 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/150/152

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:22:y:2007:i:1:p:3-18

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Estudios Económicos from El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ximena Varela ().