Economics at your fingertips  

Recaudador vs. contribuyente: el juego de la evasión fiscal

José Alberto Lara-Pulido ()

Estudios Económicos, 2007, vol. 22, issue 2, 313-334

Abstract: This paper incorporates the strategic interactions between tax payers and fiscal authorities to the standard theory of fiscal evasion. The existence and (local) unicity of Nash equilibrium are demonstrated by the players' best responses. Through a numerical analysis, it is concluded that “greater sanctions, the establishment of fiscal discipline, the improvement of monitoring processes, and less corruption, reduce fiscal evasion". Finally, it is established that, if sufficiently deep, progressiveness on the tax system has a beneficial impact in collection, and that economic growth provokes both, a reduction in evasion and the improvement of social welfare.

Keywords: tax evasion; game theory; fiscal policies; behaviour of economic agents; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D73 H26 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Estudios Económicos from El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ximena Varela ().

Page updated 2022-11-26
Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:22:y:2007:i:2:p:313-334