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Tráfico de drogas, políticas de disuasión y violencia en México

Lenin Arango Castillo
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Lenin Arango Castillo: Université du Québec à Montréal

Estudios Económicos, 2011, vol. 26, issue 2, 157-185

Abstract: This paper analyzes the levels of violence generated by the implementation of policies to discourage crime in an oligopolistic market and with a closed economy. Initially we analyze a policy of tolerance, in which criminal organizations select the level of violence necessary to stay in the drug market. Subsequently, we analyze a policy of fighting against organized crime: the results show that this policy reduces the number of criminal organizations, and increases profits for those organizations that remain on the market, while increasing drug production and violence. Finally, we discuss the hypothetical case of fighting demand for drugs.

Keywords: deterrence policy; crime organization; violence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:26:y:2011:i:2:p:157-185