Tráfico de drogas, políticas de disuasión y violencia en México
Lenin Arango Castillo
Additional contact information
Lenin Arango Castillo: Université du Québec à Montréal
Estudios Económicos, 2011, vol. 26, issue 2, 157-185
This paper analyzes the levels of violence generated by the implementation of policies to discourage crime in an oligopolistic market and with a closed economy. Initially we analyze a policy of tolerance, in which criminal organizations select the level of violence necessary to stay in the drug market. Subsequently, we analyze a policy of fighting against organized crime: the results show that this policy reduces the number of criminal organizations, and increases profits for those organizations that remain on the market, while increasing drug production and violence. Finally, we discuss the hypothetical case of fighting demand for drugs.
Keywords: deterrence policy; crime organization; violence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:esteco:v:26:y:2011:i:2:p:157-185
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Estudios Económicos from El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rocío Contreras ().